sures of set extension that quantify the pro portion of possible worlds where a proposi tion is true.
Resemblance between possible worlds is quantified by a generalized similarity rela tion, i.e., a function that assigns a number between 0 and 1 to every pair of possible worlds. Using this similarity relation, which is a form of numerical complement of a clas sic metric or distance, it is possible to de fine and interpret the major constructs and methods of fuzzy logic: conditional and un conditional possibility and necessity distri butions and the generalized modus ponens of Zadeh.
Introduction
In this paper, we present a semantic model of the major concepts, structures, and methods of fuzzy or possibilistic [13, 14] logic. This model is based on a framework that com bines the notion of a possible world [1] , i.e., a potential state or situation of a real-world system, with measures of proximity or re semblance between pairs of possible worlds. The resulting structures are substantially different in character from those of proba bilistic reasoning, based on measures of set extension, that quantify the proportion of possible worlds where a given proposition is true.
The results reported in this paper are the latest in a continuing investigative ef fort aimed at clarifying basic conceptual sim ilarities and differences between a number of approaches to the treatment of impreci sion and uncertainty. Using also possible world semantic models, prior research has established that the Dempster-Shafer calcu lus of evidence may be interpreted by struc tures that result from the combination of conventional probabilistic calculus with epis temic logics [7) . By contrast, the formal structures discussed herein clearly show that fuzzy logic may be understood in a straight forward fashion by using conventional metric notions in a space of possible worlds with out resorting in any form to probabilistic concepts. Furthermore, the actual functions that are used to combine possibilistic knowl edge are substantially different from those used in the probability calculus.
Our exposition, which will be limited to the major structures of fuzzy logic, defines possibilistic concepts by using a more prim ive notion that has been found to be an es sential component of important human cog nitive processes (11) . The notion of similar ity, in spite of its importance in reasoning processes, has not received substantial atten tion in treatments based on the use of logical concepts.
Perhaps as a consequence of its reliance on methods for the manipulation of symbolic strings and on a single partial order rela tion (implication) between formulas as the basis for its derivation procedures, there has 282 been little attention given in formal logic to the consideration of other formal structures that capture important features of human knowledge such as the resemblance that ex ists between situations or circumstances. Al though, for example, stating that the tem perature is 28°C as opposed to saying that it is 29°C may be rather inconsequential in terms of the implication of either statement to a decision-maker (e.g., trying to decide what to wear), there is nothing in the ba sic framework of logic that makes the sec ond statement any more different than to say that the temperature is below freezing (as neither of the three statements is logi cally consistent with the other two).
The determination and use of similarity information is, however, not only central to all forms of analogical reasoning but it is an essential element in the derivation of physi cal law. Formal studies in measurement the ory [6) clearly show the role that measures based on similar behavior play in the deriva tion of rational measurement schemes, while also explaining the ubiquitous presence of numeric scales throughout science.
The results presented in this paper show that, when such notions of proximity are for malized in the context of a possible-worlds model, the major functional structures of fuzzy logic, possibility and necessity distri butions, and its major inferential procedure, the generalized modus ponens of Zadeh, may be readily explained as a natural extension of classical logical concepts. In particular, possibility and necessity distributions sim ply correspond to best and worst scenarios in a space of possible real-world states, while the generalized modus ponens [14] is a sound inferential procedure that may be regarded as a form of logical extrapolation between The scope of this paper prevents a de tailed discussion of all pertinent results and derivations. A complete account of all rele vant matters regarding this similarity-based model of fuzzy logic is presented in a related technical note [8] , which this paper summa nzes. 2 The A pp roximate Reasonin g Problem
Our model of the approximate reasoning problem is based on the notion of "possible world." Informally, possible worlds are the conceivable states of affairs of a real-world system that are consistent with the laws of logic.
Restricting ourselves, for the sake of sim plicity to propositional formulations, a pos sible world is a function [1] that assigns a unique conventional truth value (i.e., true or false) to every proposition that describes some relevant aspect of the state of a real world system and that, in addition, satisfies the axioms of propositional logic.
In the absence of any knowledge about the behavior of a system of interest or of any ob servation about its state, it is impossible to determine which, among all conceivable sit uations, corresponds to the actual state of the real world. Availability of factual ev idence or determination of the laws of be havior of the system permits us, however, to eliminate from consideration some possible worlds in this universe of discourse. The re maining possible worlds correspond to satis fiable propositions that, in addition, are logi cally consistent with the evidence. This sub set of conceivable situations or scenarios will be called the evidential set, denoted S'.
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If the typical reasoning problem is thought of as the determination of the truth value of a proposition h (the hypothesis), then an approximate reasoning problem may be de scribed as one where available evidence does not permit such evaluation without ambigu ity. In other words, as illustrated in Figure 1 , there are some members of the evidential set where the hypothesis is true and some where it is false.
HYPOTHESIS TRUE HYPOTHESIS FALSE
Figure 1: The approximate reasoning prob lem Our approach to the formalization of the major concepts and structures of fuzzy logic is based on a generalization of a central concept of semantic models of modal log ics. Modal logics [3] may be generally de scribed as extensions of conventional two valued logic that permit us to qualify, in various ways, the meaning of propositional truth.
In our model, we utilize modal concepts to explain basic possibilistic structures using the more primitive notion of similarity. This notion is introduced, however, by means of conventional set-theoretic and logical con cepts. In this regard, our approach to the study of the interplay of modal and pos sibilistic logics is different from approaches such as that used by Lakoff [5] , who sought to generalize modal logics using fuzzy-set con cepts; or that of Dubois and Prade [2] , who investigated modal structures with a view to the development of formal proof mechanisms in possibilistic logic.
A major concept of semantic models of modal logic systems is a binary relation R, called the accessibility or conceivability re lation, which is assumed to have a number of properties intended to capture the seman tics of various qualifications of propositional truth.
Our aim is to characterize the extent to which statements that are true in one situ ation or scenario may be said, perhaps with some suitable modification, to be true in an other state of affairs that resembles the first. We are particularly interested in describing more general (i.e., less specific) propositions that are true in one possible world as a func tion of the propositions that are true in an other. In order to model a continuous range of proximity between possible worlds, we will generalize the notion of accessibility relation to a full family of binary relations Ran in dexed by a numerical parameter a taking values between 0 and 1, along the same lines, albeit with a different purpose, as Lewis in his treatment of counterfactuals [4] . The function S is intended to capture a notion of proximity, closeness, or resem blance between possible worlds, with a value of 1 corresponding to the identity of possi ble worlds and a value of 0 indicating that knowledge of propositions that are true in one possible world does not provide any in dication about propositions that are true in the other. To assure that the function S has the semantics of a relation that quantifies re semblance between possible states of affairs it is necessary to require that it satisfies a number of properties.
Besides the above mentioned property that the similarity between a possible world and itself has the highest possible value, equivalent to stating that each accessibility relation Ra is reflexive, we will also require that the similarity between different possi ble worlds be strictly less than one. This requirement is intended to assure that the similarity relation may distinguish between different states of the possible world.
The similarity relation will also be as sumed to be symmetric, and to satisfy a relaxed form of transitivity. Clearly, if the pairs of possible worlds ( w, w ' ) and ( w ' , w") correspond to highly similar situations, it 
where ®is a binary operator used to repre sent the lower bound for S( w, w "
) as a func tion of its arguments. This requirement is equivalent to the relaxed transitivity condi tion Ra@/3 � Ra oR/3, which replaces the usual, more stringent, definition of transitivity. Imposition of reasonable requirements upon the function ® shows that it has the properties of a triangular norm [9] . These functions, which play a significant role in multivalued logics [10] , may be justified, therefore, purely on the basis of metric con siderations. Important examples of triangu lar norms are a ®b =min( a, b), a ®b =max( a+ b-1, 0), and a®b = ab, called the Zadeh, Lukasiewicz, and product triangular norms, respectively. The generalized transitivity property ex pressed by triangular norms clarifies their re lationship to the conventional mathematical concept of metric. If S is a similarity func tion, then the function 8 = 1 -S has the properties of a distance function. When ® corresponds to the Lukasiewicz norm, then the transitivity property of S corresponds to the well-known triangular property of dis tance functions. If ® correponds to the Zadeh triangular norm, then 8 may be shown to satisfy the more stringent ultrametric in equality. 285 
Degrees of Im plication and Consistence
The classical derivation rule of modus po nens is easily interpreted in terms of subsets of possible worlds, since each proposition corresponds to one such set, while implica tion corresponds to the conventional relation of subset inclusion. In short, if three propo sitions p, q and r are equated with the corre sponding subsets of possible worlds, and if it is known that pis a subset of q (i.e., p ::::} q) and that q is a subset of r (i.e., q ::::} r ), then the modus ponens simply states that p is a subset of r (i.e., p => r ). While only two degrees of inclusion are recognized in two-valued logic, in that a set is either a subset of another set or it is not, the introduction of a similarity struc ture permits the definition of a graded no tion of inclusion.
To illustrate the relationship between this new concept and generalized modal con cepts, we will extend first the classical def inition of the modal operator II in the fol lowing way: a proposition p will be said to be possible to th e degree o in the possible world w (denoted w 1-II0p ) if there exists a world w ' such that p is true in w ' and such that S( w, w ' ) � o. Furthermore, we will say that q necessarily implies, or is a necessary model of p to the degree o, if every q-world w is such that pis possible to the degree c:t . . m w , I.e., q => llaP·
The definition of graded necessary impli cation generalizes the corresponding modal notion, by permitting us to express that q is a subset of a neighborhood, of specified size, of p. Since every possible world is similar, at least to the degree zero, to every other possible world, it is obvious that every subset of possible worlds implies every other subset to some degree a between 0 and 1. In simpler words, if pis stretched1 to the degree a, then this stretched set will include q. The upper bound of the values a such that q necessarily implies p to the degree o:, expressed by l(p I q) = inf sup S( w, w ' ) , w'l-q wl-p provides a most useful measure of the min imal amount of stretching required to cover q with a neighborhood of p, as illustrated in Figure 2 . The function I will be called the degree of implication. The degree of implication function pro vides the basis for the derivation of the gen eralized modus ponens of Zadeh [13] . This rule generalizes its classical counterparts by stating, in quantitative terms, the inclusion relations that hold between neighborhoods of three propositions, which is expressed by the transitive property of the degree of im plication function l(pjq) ;::: I(pjr)®l(rjq).
This transitive property may also be ex pressed using modal operators in the form 1 Recall that S is a similarity measure and that lower values of c:r correspond to higher values of stretching.
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imply that q => Ila®PP·
This simplest form of the generalized modus ponens, illustrated in Figure 3 , tells us how much p should be stretched to en compass q on the basis of knowledge of the sizes of the neighborhoods of p that includes rand of r that includes q. In addition to a function defining a de gree of implication, we will also need a dual notion, called the degree of consistence, to quantify the amount by which a set must be stretched in order to intersect another set. The degree of consistence of p and q is de fined by the expression C(p I q) =sup sup S(w, w ' ) .
w'l-q wl-p
It is obvious from the definition that l(p I q) < C ( p I q) .
S Possibilistic Distributions
The customary expression of the generalized modus ponens in fuzzy logic, which is more general than the simple transitive law of the degree of implication given above, is ex pressed by means of possibility and necessity distributions. As is the case with their prob abilistic counterparts, these functions may This interpretation of necessity and pos sibility distributions readily leads to the derivation of a number of properties for these functions such as the basic laws, usually as sumed as axioms, linking the possibility and necessity of disjunctions with those of the disjuncts.
To define conditional possibility and ne cessity distributions it is necessary to intro duce a form of inverse of the triangular norm. This function permits us to state the transi tive property of similarity relations by using an equivalent formulation of triangular in equalities, along the lines used in plane ge ometry to express the relation that exists be tween the three sides of a triangle, i.e., either (the length of ) a side is smaller than the sum of the other two, or a side is larger than the difference of the other two.
If ® is a triangular norm, its pseudoin verse 0 is the function, defined over pairs of numbers in the unit interval of the real line, The following definitions make use of the inverse of triangular norms to characterize conditional possibility and necessity distri butions as measures of the proximity rela tions that exist between evidential worlds and those worlds satisfying a consequent proposition q as a proportion of the sim ilarity that exists between those eviden tial worlds and worlds that satisfy the an tecedent proposition p. wl-l" 6 
Generalized Modus Ponens
The compositional rule of inference or gener alized modus ponens of of Zadeh [13] gener alizes the corresponding classical rule of in ference, permitting to infer statements even when a perfect match does not exist be tween the antecedent of a conditional rule and known facts, i.e., from p p --+to its approximate version
where p ' and q' are similar to p and q, re spectively.
The generalized modus ponens may be viewed, therefore, as an extrapolation pro cedure that exploits the similarity between the known facts, or the evidence formalized as the evidential set, and a set of possible worlds or the antecedent proposition p, to gether with expressions relating the prox imity of p-worlds and q-worlds, to bound the similarity between evidential worlds and those that satisfy the consequent proposition q.
The actual formal statement of the gener alized modus ponens makes use of the notion of partition of the universe of discourse. As a simple extension of the notion of disjoint partition of a set, a partition .!J" is simply de fined as a collection of mutually inconsistent propositions such that their disjunction is al ways true, or, equivalently, as a collection of disjoint subsets of possible worlds such that their union is the universe of discourse. In most applications of fuzzy set theory, parti tions follow naturally from the notion of vari able since every possible world corresponds to a unique value of a system variable.
Using this concept, it is possible to state the following results that allow derivation of necessity and possibility distributions for a consequent proposition q, on the basis of approximate knowledge expressed by uncon ditioned distributions for antecedent propo sitions p in the partition .!J", and condi tional distributions relating these anteC:edent propositions with q. .!JI' 7 
Conclusion
This paper summarizes some aspects of a se mantic model of fuzzy logic that is rooted on notions of similarity or resemblance between conceivable states of the real world. These metric structures are conceptually and func tionally different from those that are used in probabilistic reasoning, which rely on mea sures of set extension.
The essential difference between the aims and structures of probabilistic and possi bilistic formulations that is clarified by this model is readily understood when it is noted that being in a situation s does not make a similar situation s' more likely, or vice versa. Reality is described in one case by summary accounts of past experience and, in the other, by comparison with other states introduced
